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Background: People usually feel they cause their own actions and the consequences of those actions, i.e., they
attribute behavior to the proper agent. Research suggests that there are two routes to the experience of
self-agency: 1) an explicit route, where one has the intention to obtain a goal (if it occurs, I must have
done it) and 2) an implicit route, where information about the goal is unconsciously available and increases
the feeling of self-agency. Schizophrenia patients typically experience no behavioral control and exhibit dif-
ﬁculties in distinguishing one's own actions from those of others. The present study investigates differences
in both routes to self-agency experiences between schizophrenia patients and controls.
Methods: Twenty-three schizophrenia patients and 23 controls performed a task where they performed an
action (button press) and subsequently indicated whether or not they were the agent of the consequence
of this action (the outcome) on a 9-point scale. The task can be manipulated to measure both the explicit
and implicit route (by using priming) to the experience of self-agency.
Results: In the explicit condition (participants intended to produce a speciﬁc outcome, and this outcome
matched their goal), both groups experienced enhanced self-agency. In the implicit condition (the outcome
matched the primed outcome), healthy controls showed increased self-agency over the outcome, while pa-
tients did not. Potential differences in task motivation and attention did not explain these ﬁndings.
Conclusions: These ﬁndings provide new evidence for the idea that implicit processes leading to feelings of
self-agency may be disturbed in schizophrenia.© 2012 Elsevier B.V. Open access under the Elsevier OA license.1. Introduction
I hold my hand up and a taxi stops for a ride. I make a joke, people
start laughing. Whether engaging in simplemotor movements or social
interactions, we feel we cause our own actions and their consequences.
This feeling is usually referred to as self-agency and is essential for
human self-perception and social communication.
Common sense suggests that the feeling of self-agency results from
the conscious intention to engage in behavior and attain speciﬁc out-
comes. That is, if I had the explicit goal of doing it and then it occurred,
I must have done it. However, in everyday social life humans regularly
behave without much conscious thought, and their behavior produces
outcomes over which they can nevertheless experience self-agency. In
otherwords, information in our environment thatwe are not consciously
aware of can inﬂuence our behavior and our feelings of self-causation
(Wegner, 2002).
We are not all blessed with a well-operating sense of self-agency.
Schizophrenia patients often exhibit difﬁculties in distinguishing one's
own actions and outcomes from those of others. They hear voices or
feel their limbs being controlled by external sources. As a consequencerecht University, Heidelberglaan
2.
vier OA license.patients' autonomy and their professional and personal achievements
are reduced and they experience problems in social interactions and
relationships with family and peers (Walker et al., 2004).
Previous research has led to the notion that disturbed experiences of
self-agency in schizophrenia may derive from disturbances in the
sensory-motor system that controls voluntary action (Daprati et al.,
1997; Morrison and Haddock, 1997; Franck et al., 2001; Haggard et al.,
2003; Voss et al., 2010). When performing a voluntary motor action,
the sensory-motor system compares the predicted and actual sensory
consequences that follow from that action. To enable people to differen-
tiate between self and other-produced sensory signals, the sensory
signals of self-generated movements are attenuated. This generates a
feeling of self-agency when matching the actual sensory consequences
with the predicted consequences (Wolpert, 1997; Blakemore and Frith,
2003). However, patients with schizophrenia fail to differentiate be-
tween the perception of self-produced and externally produced sensory
signals. Consequently, schizophrenia patients' self-produced tactile
stimulation feels as tickly, as other-produced tickling because it is not
perceptually attenuated as is the case in controls (Blakemore et al.,
2000; Shergill et al., 2005).
Interestingly, recent work shows that people can also experience
self-agency over outcomes in situations where the motor prediction
processes may not inform self-agency, so outside of the context of voli-
tional behavior (Aarts et al., 2005; Moore et al., 2009; Dogge et al.,
Table 1
Characteristics of patients with schizophrenia and control subjects (means±s.d.).
Schizophrenia
patients (N=23)
Normal controls
(N=23)
Age 32.7±7.1 28.5±8.6
Male/female 20/3 19/4
Years of education 13.2±2.0 14.1±1.7
Parental years of education 13.9±3.4 14.0±2.5
Illness duration (years)a 13.8±8.5 –
PANSS Positive score 14.7±4.4 –
PANSS negative score 16.5±7.0 –
PANSS general score 32.2±8.3 –
Medication doseb 7.3±4.0 –
a Time between the onset of psychotic symptoms and inclusion in the study.
b Mean dose in mg/day haloperidol equivalents.
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and the resulting effects is an inference because one cannot directly ob-
serve causal connections between them. These cognitive inferences
occur ﬂuently and perfunctorily after action performance and, in princi-
ple, this process can operate outside of conscious awareness.
To infer that one was the agent of an action and its consequences is
always retrospective. Recent research suggests two routes that model
the inferential nature of authorship processing (Wegner, 2002; Aarts
et al., 2005). An explicit one, in which people infer agency when an ac-
tual outcome of an action is in agreement with their intentions to pro-
duce the speciﬁc action-outcome (I do something, it happens so I
must have done it); and an implicit one, in which agency inferences
are based on matches between actual outcomes of action and subtly
pre-activated information about the action outcome. By using short pre-
sentation times (i.e., often referred to as priming) one can decrease the
likelihood of conscious processing of information that yet activates the
representation of action outcomes before performing the action. Subse-
quently observing the actual outcomes can thus enhance the experience
of self-agency.
Both routes can contribute to inferences of agency in that people use
sensory evidence to establish agency in retrospect. Aarts et al. (2005)
showed that both intention to cause a speciﬁc outcome and priming
of the action-outcome increased the sense of being the agent of the
action outcome when that outcome actually occurred. These ﬁndings
have been replicated across different tasks (Linser and Goschke, 2007;
van der Weiden et al., 2010), and cultures (Sato, 2009).
Things may be different for patients with schizophrenia. That the
explicit route to inference of self-agency may be intact in patients
with schizophrenia is suggested by a study focusing on intentional
binding. This is the phenomenon that people perceive their own actions
as occurring later in time when they are followed by an external effect,
compared to actions not followed by such effects. As such, intentional
binding is an indirect measure of self-agency and it can be predictively
or retrospectively generated. A predictive sense of agency means that
an action is predicted to produce a given effect, whereas retrospective
sense of agency means that one infers retrospectively that one's action
caused the effect. Voss et al. (2010) showed that patients are able to ret-
rospectively infer a sense of agency over their actions using the inten-
tional binding task within the context of voluntary action. The present
study aims to conceptually replicate this ﬁnding by testing whether
patients display enhanced experienced agency over behavior when
the actual outcome of their actionmatches their explicit goal to produce
the outcome in a context where motor prediction processes are ruled
out.
The prediction is less clear-cut when considering the implicit
route to inferences of self-agency in patients with schizophrenia.
Therefore, we conducted an experiment to explore whether the im-
plicit route to self-agency is impaired in patients. If it is impaired,
then priming an outcome of an action before performing the action
and observing the corresponding outcome may not alter their experi-
ences of self-agency.
2. Methods
2.1. Subjects
Twenty-three schizophrenia patients and 23 healthy controls partici-
pated in the study. Patients were recruited from the psychiatry depart-
ment of the University Medical Centre Utrecht. The study was approved
by the Humans Ethics Commission of University Medical Centre Utrecht.
Participants gave written consent and were ﬁnancially compensated for
study participation.
Psychopathology levels were established by using the Comprehensive
Assessment of Symptoms and History (CASH; Andreasen et al., 1992). All
patients met DSM-IV criteria for schizophrenia. Symptom levels were
assessed with the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS; Kay etal., 1987) by trained raters. Patients were receiving atypical antipsy-
chotics at time of testing, except for onewhowas on typical antipsychot-
ic medication.
Comparison subjects had no psychiatric history, no ﬁrst-degree
relatives with a psychotic illness, and did not use chronic medication.
A history of closed-head injury, neurological illness or endocrinological
dysfunction were criteria for exclusion. Patients and controls did not
differ signiﬁcantly on demographic variables. See Table 1.
2.2. Procedures and measures
2.2.1. Agency inference task and procedure
Participants learned that the studywas designed to examine people's
feelings of personal causation and how these feelings come and go. The
agency inference task was taken from Aarts et al. (2005). See Fig. 1. In
this computer-task, participants pressed the S-key on the keyboard to
cause a square to rapidly traverse a rectangular path, consisting of
eight white squares, in a counter-clockwise direction. The computer in-
dependently moved another square along the path at the same speed,
but in the opposite direction. When “stop” appeared in the center of
the screen they had to press the “Enter” key immediately, thereby stop-
ping themovement. This action turned one of the eight white tiles black,
which represented the ﬁnal position of either their own square, or the
computer's. The computer always determined the stops and thus actual
stops occurred independently of participants' action (i.e., key-press).
After each stop, participants reported their sense of self-agency by indi-
cating the extent towhich they felt they had caused the displayed square
to stop at that particular position [9-point scale: not at all (1)–strongly
(9)].
After participants practiced and understood the task, the experiment
proceeded with two conditions to examine the implicit and explicit
routes to inferences of self-agency. Speciﬁcally, in the implicit condition
an outcome location was subtly primed (i.e., the location ﬂashed up for
17 ms) before participants pressed the stop-key and saw the outcome
location. Priming refers to the very short (and often incidental) exposure
to a stimulus that inﬂuences a response to a later stimulus, as the prime
activates the representation of the outcome during ongoing action, with-
out requiring a predetermined intention (Aarts et al., 2005). In the ex-
plicit condition they received the explicit goal (i.e., intention) to stop
on a certain location before starting the trial.
Each condition comprises 32 trials that were divided in 2 blocks of
16 trials. In each block, the black square was used as a prime or as an
explicit goal twice on each of the eight tiles of the path. Crucially, half
of the trials matched the outcome information (being presented as a
goal/intention or as a prime), and the other half mismatched this infor-
mation. The trials were randomly presented within a block. To prevent
instruction carryover effects, the session started with the implicit task
and was followed by the explicit condition task. There was a short
break (30 s) between the blocks within a condition, and a longer
break (5 min) between the two conditions (see the online supplemen-
tary material for task details).
Fig. 1. Illustration of the experimental task showing how the square of the subject and
the square of the computer move in opposite direction before participants stop them.
Participants are shown where one of the squares stopped (i.e. the location is the out-
come of their action (or not)).
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Because schizophrenia is associated with decreases in motivation
(Konstantakopoulos et al., 2011), we administered a self-report mea-
sure of task motivation for both conditions separately. Speciﬁcally, par-
ticipants indicated the level of importance to perform well and how
much they tried to focus their attention on the task [9-point scale: not
at all (1)–strongly (9)].
Additionally, we assessed two measures to investigate attentional
processes. First, participants indicated the extent to which they were
able to follow their own rotating square in both tasks [9-point scale:
not at all (1)–strongly (9)]. This can be considered as ameasure of visual
attention maintenance. Second, response times to the stop cue were
recorded and provide an objectivemeasure of the ease of shifting atten-
tion from the rotating squares to the execution of the stoppingbehavior.
2.3. Statistical analyses
The averaged self-agency experiences on matching and mismatching
trials were subjected to a repeated measures ANOVA with Group
(patient/control) as a between-subjects measure and Type (implicit
(prime)/explicit (intention)) and Matching (matching/mismatching
outcome) as within-subjects measures.
To examine the role of task motivation and attention for both the
implicit and explicit condition separately, ANOVAs were performed to
test differences between groups, and ANCOVAs were used to control
the main analyses for these measures.
3. Results
3.1. Self-agency experiences
A Group effect was found, implicating that patients experienced less
self-agency compared to controls. Furthermore, main effects were
found for Type and Matching. Agency experiences were lower in theimplicit compared to the explicit condition, and agency experiences
were stronger in matching relative to mismatching trials. In addition,
the signiﬁcant Type-by-Matching interaction indicated that the effect
ofmatchingwas smaller in the implicit than in the explicit condition. Im-
portantly, all these effects were qualiﬁed by a signiﬁcant Type-by-
Matching-by-Group interaction. The mean self-agency experiences of
each cell in the design are displayed in Fig. 2 and Table 2.
To gain insight in the nature of the 3-way interaction we used
ANOVAs to test effects ofMatching andGroup in the explicit and implicit
condition separately. In the explicit condition main effects of Group and
Matching were found. Controls reported stronger self-agency experi-
ences than patients. Furthermore, matches between the actual outcome
and the intended outcome led to stronger experiences of self-agency
than mismatches. Importantly, the Matching-by-Group interaction was
not signiﬁcant, indicating that the explicit route to the feeling of
self-agency operated equally well in both groups.
In the implicit condition, a main effect of Matching indicated stron-
ger self-agency experiences when actual outcomes matched with
primed outcomes compared to mismatches. Furthermore, a signiﬁcant
Matching-by-Group interaction emerged. Simple main effects showed
that the Matching effect was signiﬁcant only in the control group, not
in patients. This indicates that implicit (primed) pre-activation of out-
come information did not increase self-agency experiences in patients
only.
3.2. Task attention
No signiﬁcant differences were found between the groups on the
self-reported measure of task attention during both conditions (see
supplementary tables), implicating that patients and controls were
equally able to maintain visual attention to the rotating squares.
The response time to the stop-cue provides an index for speed of
shifting attention from the rotating squares to the execution of the ac-
tual stopping behavior. As expected, there was a signiﬁcant main ef-
fect of Type, indicating that participants took longer to respond to
the stop-cue in the explicit than in the implicit task. This conﬁrms
that having an explicit goal to stop at a speciﬁc location takes more
time to act than doing so without a conscious intention, as is typical
for conscious processes (Kahneman, 2011). Importantly, there was
no effect of Group nor Type-by-Group interaction, suggesting that
groups performed equally well on switching attention from the rotat-
ing squares to the stopping behavior, and hence, potential differences
in attention/motor execution performance do not seem to explain the
pattern of ﬁndings on the self-agency experiences.
3.3. Task motivation
The two itemswere averaged to obtain ameasure of taskmotivation
for the implicit and explicit conditions. Correlations between this mea-
sure and the self agency rating showed that subjective measures of mo-
tivation were relevant to the task (implicit: r(46)=0.37, p=.01;
explicit: r(46)=0.48, p=.001). In the implicit condition no signiﬁcant
group difference was found, but in the explicit condition patients were
signiﬁcantly lessmotivated than controls (see supplementary tables). A
trend-level regression effect of themotivationmeasure on thematching
effect was found, indicating that higher motivation was associatedwith
a stronger matching effect. Importantly, controlling the implicit and ex-
plicit matching effects for the motivation measure produced the same
pattern of results as the original ﬁndings.
4. Discussion
The present study explored the explicit and implicit routes to infer-
ences of self-agency experiences in schizophrenia patients and healthy
subjects. Our results demonstrate that the explicit route operates
equally well in both groups, as both felt more self-agency when their
Fig. 2. Self-agency experiences as a function of Group (patient/control), Type (explicit/implicit) and Matching (match/mismatch). The black horizontal line indicates the mean.
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served outcome compared towhen the outcomedid notmatch their in-
tention. For patients, this ﬁnding is on par with other recent research
suggesting that – in an explicit context – schizophrenia patients can
use sensory evidence to form retrospective inferences of agency (Voss
et al., 2010).
In line with previous research (Aarts et al., 2005), healthy subjects
showed enhanced experiences of self-agency when an implicitly pre-
activated outcome matched the observed outcome, suggesting that
both explicit and implicit processing of action-outcome information aug-
ments agency experiences. However, patients did not show this effect,
suggesting that their implicit processing route to self-agency experiences
was impaired. Importantly, these group differences could not be attribut-
ed to differences in subjectively reported motivation or attention. Such
disturbances are important to investigate as they might underlie poorTable 2
Statistical analyses for self-agency experiences.
Main analyses (df=44) F Sig. η2
Group 5.25 .03 .107
Type 6.04 .02 .121
Matching 79.2 b .001 .643
Type×group 0.91 .345 .020
Matching×group 1.08 .304 .024
Type×matching 69.7 b .001 .613
Type×matching×group 9.00 b .01 .170
Follow-up Analyses (df=44) Explicit Implicit
F Sig. η2 F Sig. η2
Group 5.72 .02 .115 0.71 .40 .016
Matching 145.8 b .001 .768 8.78 b .01 .166
Matching×group 0.56 b .46 .013 6.15 b .01 .123
Simple main effects (df=22) Controls Patients
Explicit matching 88.0 b .001 .800 64.7 b .001 .746
Implicit matching 13.2 .001 .374 0.12 .72 .006everyday social interactionswhere behavior often starts andunfolds out-
side of conscious awareness (Waters and Badcock, 2008).
Unfortunately, no objective test was obtained to measure a potential
covert attentional deﬁcit in the patients, and therefore we cannot ex-
clude the possibility that patients processed the primes in a different
way as than controls. However, evidence suggests that patients showde-
layed conscious reporting of primes compared to controls, but – critical
to the current study – are unimpaired in processing primes (Dehaene
et al., 2003; Del Cul et al., 2006). Moreover, schizophrenia patients per-
form equal to healthy controls in spatial priming tasks, showing
unimpaired processing of primed outcome-information even without
ﬁxating on this information (Spencer et al., 2011). It is important to
note, though, that the duration of these primes was longer as compared
to the primes in our task.
The observed differences in this study between patients and healthy
controls raise questions about potentialmechanisms that undermine the
implicit (but not the explicit) nature of self-agency inferences in schizo-
phrenia. One possiblemechanism deals with theway the brain produces
self-agency inferences.While the neurological basis is not yet fully delin-
eated, it appears that experienced agency relies on frontal brain areas
dealing with self-consciousness, and parietal regions representing
primed goals or outcomes of movements (Frith, 1996; Jeannerod,
1999). Explicitly intended outcomes of behavior or goals are likely to
enter the authorship process by gaining access to a widespread brain
network broadcasting information to the frontal cortices (Baars, 1988;
Dehaene and Naccache, 2001), and this process seems to effectively
emerge in both health and schizophrenia. Once the outcome occurs,
agency can be inferred by comparing the intention/goal and actual out-
come, translating a match into experiences of self-agency. However, in
implicit authorship processing (i.e. without global information broad-
casting) the connection with the parietal area allows the frontal brain
to establish a sense of agency by processing primed outcomes and actual
outcomes. It might be that these regions are not properly connected in
patients with schizophrenia (Honey et al., 2002; Burns et al., 2003). In-
deed, evidence suggests disintegrated ﬁber integrity in the connection
between frontal and temporo-parietal areas in schizophrenic patients
54 R.A. Renes et al. / Schizophrenia Research 143 (2013) 50–54(deWeijer et al., 2011). Thus, the fronto-parietal network appears essen-
tial in the authorship ascription process, and impaired neural connectiv-
ity in this network may render implicit processes underlying inferences
of self-agency less likely to occur in schizophrenia.
In conclusion, we show that schizophrenia patients are disturbed in
implicit information processes underlying inferences of experienced
self-agency. These abnormalitiesmight underlie poor social interactions
that often unfold implicitly and outside of awareness.
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